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Abstract
Starting in late 2012, and continuing into late 2013, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York wreaked havoc on the
traditional interpretation of the copyright infringement defense known as “fair use.”
Two cases stemming from the advent of the Google Books Project are Author’s
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. These cases
adopted a controversial interpretation of the fair use defense, codified in 17 U.S.C. §
107, when each case determined that the mass digitization of thousands of books
constituted fair use merely because the digitization was what is known as
“transformative use.”
This Comment will explore the background of the fair use defense, from its
common law origins, to its codification in the 1976 Copyright Act, to its application
in modern law. Keeping this background in mind will explain why the current legal
state of the fair use defense, as propagated by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the United States Courts Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is
inconsistent with traditional statutory construction principles.
Proposed recommendations to solve legal inconsistencies in Section 107 can
come from clarification either from Congress by way of an amendment to this
Section, or by a decision from the United States Supreme Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 10, 2012, Judge Baer handed down a decision that fueled
dramatic change to the fair use doctrine of U.S. copyright law. In Author’s Guild v.
HathiTrust, Judge Baer upheld the actions of a group of academic libraries to
digitize their collections by partnering with Google in the Google Books project. 1
The court held that these actions did not fall under the Copyright Act’s library
exception, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 108, but instead would be afforded a fair use
defense, found at 17 U.S.C. § 107.2
On November 13, 2013, Judge Chin of the same court continued this
dramatic change by ruling for a commercial entity with a fair use defense. In
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Judge Chin upheld Google’s fair use defense for
the complete copying and digital reproduction of millions of copyrighted materials.3
These holdings are a radical change from precedent leading up to the
codification of the fair use defense.4 Only the Ninth Circuit applies the fair use
defense as the New York courts did, using a contested interpretation of
transformative use, which was a major basis for both Author’s Guild decisions.5
Each Southern District of New York judge focused on the way that defendants,
Google and HathiTrust, transformed the copyrighted works in new and socially
valuable ways that varied greatly from the uses of the original books and articles. 6
Traditionally, the fair use judicial interpretation balanced rewarding authors and
creators with intellectually enriching the public; the dramatic shift in the Southern

Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the fair use
defense was available to the universities and that the systematic digitization of copyrighted books
contained within the universities libraries’ was protected by the fair use doctrine).
2 Id. at 456-58.
3 Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the fair use
defense was available to Google, a commercial Internet search engine, for the systematic digitization
of copyrighted books from partner libraries).
4 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010); see generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(enumerating the fair use defense as it was usually applied at common law as well as the four factors
generally associated with those codified in the current Copyright Act).
5 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that displaying a ‘thumbnail’
version of a copyrighted picture on an Internet search engine was a transformative use, and
therefore protectable under the fair use doctrine); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Google’s use of ‘thumbnail’ images of copyrighted images was a
transformative use and protectable under the fair use doctrine). But see, e.g. Sandford Gray
Thatcher, One Publisher’s Take on the Google Decision, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/one-publishers-take-on-the-google-books-decision.
6 See generally Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (explaining that Google’s scanning of the copyrighted
books into a keyword searchable online database was transformative from the original use of the
books); see generally HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (finding that the works in the HathiTrust
Digital Library transformative because they serve a different purpose, i.e. search capability, than the
original copyrighted works).
1
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District of New York and Ninth Circuit courts now allows mass digitization
of copyrighted works to continue without the permission of copyright holders.7
This Comment will argue that the growing theory of transformative use as
propagated by the Ninth Circuit, and adopted by New York’s Southern District, is a
judicial interpretation that is not consistent with statutory construction principles.
The decisions in HathiTrust and Google, extending the Ninth Circuit broad view of
transformative use, stray too far from the traditional analysis of the fair use
doctrine. Congressional intent is at odds with this broad interpretation, and the
principles of the Copyright Act would be better served by returning to a more
traditional interpretation. In lieu of returning to a more traditional judicial
interpretation of the fair use doctrine, there are a few legislative-based alternatives
that would allow for this kind of digitization to continue without straying from the
traditional statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Part Two of this Comment explores the background of the fair use doctrine
from its common law origins and codification through to its application in modern
law. This exploration will focus on relevant case law that developed the fair use
doctrine until its codification in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and the general application
following codification. Part Two also describes the broad Ninth Circuit
interpretation of the fair use doctrine, particularly the theory of transformative use.
Additionally, this part details the Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s
Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. decisions. Finally, this subsection explains the basics of a
statutory construction analysis.
Part Three analyzes why the transformative use interpretation is
inconsistent with traditional statutory construction principles by looking to 17
U.S.C. § 107 and its legislative history in order to conduct a statutory construction
analysis of the statutes. Part Three also explains why the decisions in Google and
in HathiTrust, specifically, veer too far from the principles of statutory construction.
Part Four provides legislative and judicial solutions to the issue of
interpreting the fair use doctrine, and more specifically, how the transformative use
theory factors in to the overall analysis.
Finally, Part Five concludes by reiterating that the current fair use defense,
as it exists in modern copyright law, is inconsistent with statutory construction
principles.
II. FROM COMMON LAW TO CODIFIED LAW TO TRANSFORMATIVE LAW: TRACING THE
HISTORY OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
In what is known as the Copyright Clause, the United States Constitution
gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (adopting Judge Leval’s view
of transformative use to help analyze the first factor of the four factor fair use doctrine test) (citing
Leval, infra note 24).
7
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”8 This clause embodies the delicate balance
struck between rewarding an author for time and effort put into creating a work
and limiting the monopoly protection to a certain amount of time, providing the
public with access to the work.9 The fair use defense plays a significant role in this
balance because it attempts to limit the protection given to the authors by giving
members of the public who meet certain criteria an affirmative defense to their
infringement of an author’s copyrighted material.10
This section discusses the origins of the fair use defense and its original
application, the codification of fair use in the Copyright Act, and finally, how it is
applied in modern law.
A. Humble Beginnings: History of Fair Use and Creation of 17 U.S.C. § 107
Justice Story once opined that “copyrights approach, nearer than any other
class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile
[sic] and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”11 Justice Story means it is
often difficult in copyright cases to come to fitting conclusions or create principles
that can be generally applied to all copyright cases.12 Copyright infringement cases,
by nature, need to be examined and analyzed case-by-case, as copying one line of a
novel may be considered infringement, whereas copying large chunks may not be
found to infringe depending on other facts and circumstances.13
The fair use defense is no different in that judges need to examine and
analyze the argument on a case-by-case basis. Justice Story recognized this in the
first case found to enumerate the factors we now know as part of the fair use
defense.14 In Folsom v. Marsh, the plaintiff had created a work on the life of
President George Washington, which included personal letters written by
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10 17 U.S.C. § 107 (allowing those defendants who meet the criteria an affirmative defense for
infringement when it is used for purposes such as teaching, reporting, or researching following an
analysis of four factors).
11 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 344-45. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (stating that there is no generally applicable fair use definition that can be applied, so each
case must decided on its own facts); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
448 (1984) (allowing a Court to use section 107 to apply an equitable rule of reason analysis to claims
based on their particular facts); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (“Indeed, since the [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no
generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its
own facts.”); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975) (“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
14 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342.
8
9
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Washington along with his biography.15 The plaintiff edited a twelve-volume work
on the life of President George Washington, the first volume containing a biography
and the following eleven volumes containing verbatim copies of President
Washington’s personal and private letters, messages and other public acts, with
some explanatory notes from the editor.16 Justice Story found that the defendant
used some of the letters from the plaintiff’s work in creating his own, shorter
biography of Washington in two volumes, copying 353 pages identically, with 319 of
these pages containing the contested verbatim copies of the Washington’s letters.17
In 1841, the Circuit Court of Massachusetts was confronted with the
questions of whether such copying was considered piracy, and if there were any
affirmative defenses to such copying.18 Justice Story laid out some factors that
could be used to determine if a person had pirated another’s copyrighted work, but
would not be held liable for his or her piracy in coming to this decision.19 This case
is the common law foundation of the analysis of the current fair use defense in U.S.
Copyright law.20
Most courts have adopted these factors to help determine if a fair use defense
was applicable in any given case.21 They were so prevalent in fact, that they were
codified as the factors for judicial consideration in the 1976 Copyright Act.22 These
factors include “the purpose and character of the use,” which includes consideration
of whether the use is commercial or not “the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”23 The fair use section says that fair use of a copyrighted work for
the purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research is not considered an infringement of copyright.24 The section then lists
factors, reminiscent of those from Justice Story, which judges may take into
consideration to determine if the facts of a case warrant a fair use defense.25
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.
Id.
17 Id. at 345-46.
18 Id. at 345-49 (finding a ‘piracy,’ which is equated with modern day copyright infringement, and
that the affirmative defense brought by the defendant fell short in this case, a defense later known
as the fair use defense).
19 Id. at 348 (“Look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.”).
20 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348; see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 1992).
21 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-80; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1106-07, 1110-12 (1990) (explaining how judges have applied fair use despite the lack of
guidance given by the codification in section 107, and how he believes Judge Story’s four factors from
Folsom should be applied).
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
15
16

15

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. VOL. 5, ISS. 1 (2015)
Transforming Transformative Use:
The Growing Misinterpretation of the Fair Use Doctrine
The Congressional notes accompanying the statute show that it is difficult to
distinguish between fair use and copyright infringement.26 Although the courts
have analyzed and ruled on the fair use defense numerous times, its codification is
the first unified attempt at defining it.27 Even with the codification, there is no
general definition to apply since fair use must be decided on a case-by-case basis.28
The legislative notes show that the purpose of the statute is to merely codify judicial
interpretation of the defense up until that point, not modify or enlarge the concept
in any way.29 It is meant to be open to further judicial interpretation and be a
starting point for a judge’s analysis.30
In the years following its codification, Section 107’s open-ended application
provided too little guidance for judges on how to recognize fair use and what extent
of copying is acceptable.31 In 1990, Judge Pierre Leval of the Second Circuit
published a law review article advocating for a fair use defense concept that is
consistent with the principles of copyright.32 These principles include the
utilitarian goal of stimulating progress of the arts for the intellectual improvement
of the public rather than giving the absolute ownership of a work to an author.33 A
judge may do this by looking at the four statutory factors given and using them to
analyze the facts of each case while considering whether a finding of fair use would
affect the objectives of copyright.34
The most important point from Judge Leval’s article is his explanation of how
a judge may analyze the first statutory factor, which considers the purpose and
character of the secondary and allegedly infringing use.35 In order to determine this
first factor, the secondary use must be analyzed to see if it is justified, and this
justification hinges on whether the challenged secondary use is transformative or
not.36 According to Judge Leval the first factor is the heart of the fair use defense,
while the other factors focus on the entitlements of the copyright owner to be
weighed against the first factor.37 Consideration of the purpose and character of
use raises the question of whether the use is justified under the objectives of

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975) (suggesting that judges
have attempted to apply this defense with the factors for consideration that have emerged within
each respective jurisdiction, with no previous statutory basis).
28 Id.
29 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62.
30 Id.
31 Leval, supra note. 21 at 1105-07.
32 Id. at 1107 (advocating that fair use should become a “rational, integral part of copyright, whose
observance is necessary to achieve the objectives of that law”).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1110-11.
35 Id. at 1111-12.
36 Id. (defining a transformative use as one that is “productive and … employ[s] the quoted matter in
a different manner or for a different purpose from the original”).
37 Leval, supra note. 21 at 1116.
26
27
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copyright law.38 If justifiable, it must be powerful enough to outweigh the rights of
the copyright owner by transforming the original work.39 This transformative use
must add value to the original work, rather than repackaging or republishing
quotations from the original material.40 Since this factor is indispensable to a fair
use defense, if a justification through transformative use is not found, then fair use
should be rejected without further analysis of the other factors.41
Judge Leval advocated successfully for this utilitarian transformative use
approach, as it was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.42 Here, the defendants wrote a commercial parody of
plaintiff’s song and the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the alleged
infringement.43 In its consideration and analysis of the issue, the Court heavily
relied on Judge Leval’s idea of transformative use and how it lies at the heart of the
fair use doctrine.44 The Court held that this specific parody did not copy excessively
from the original, and its criticism of an earlier era was transformative.45 In
adopting Judge Leval’s take on the application of the four factors listed in Section
107, the Court expanded the transformative use concept to a new class of
copyrighted works to include pictures, sculptures and music.46
This Supreme Court decision acknowledges the importance of the first
statutory factor in Section 107 to the fair use defense.47 Following this decision,
other courts began to expand this application without considering, as Judge Leval
cautioned, the core objectives of copyright law.48 This expansion began in the Ninth
Circuit.49

Leval, supra note. 21 at 1116.
Id. at 1111-12.
40 Id. (noting that transformative uses when proven do not necessarily guarantee a successful fair
use defense, especially if extensive taking from an original work imposes on the incentives for
authors to create).
41 Id. at 1116.
42 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
43 Id. at 571-73 (defendant 2 Live Crew wrote a commercial parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty
Woman” owned by plaintiff Acuff-Rose Music Inc. and the Court was to decide if it was either
infringement or fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107).
44 Id. at 578-79 (“The more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors … that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).
45 Id. at 578-85.
46 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-85.
47 Id. at 578.
48 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 811 (applying the fair use defense to an Internet search engine considering the
transformative use and public good, unbalancing the rights of the authors and creators at the core of
copyright objectives); Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1146 (applying the fair use defense to Google and
Amazon again putting the transformative use that serves the public good over the rights of the
copyright owners).
49 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163-68.
38
39

17

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. VOL. 5, ISS. 1 (2015)
Transforming Transformative Use:
The Growing Misinterpretation of the Fair Use Doctrine
B. Transformations Rewarding the Public Over Authors
The Ninth Circuit is well known for tackling issues of advancing technology
in copyright contexts.50 The results of considering these sorts of issues do not
always retain the core concepts of copyright law, which is to advance public intellect
for the exchange of return on investment by creative authors willing to share their
works.51 This is illustrated through the Circuit’s decisions in the Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp. and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc. cases.52
Arriba Soft is a search engine that displays results as small pictures, or
‘thumbnails,’ instead of displaying text; Kelly, a photographer, realized that his
images displaying scenes of the American West were part of Arriba Soft’s database,
and sued for infringement.53 In 2006, the court in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. found
that while the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s photographs was commercial in
nature, it was more incidental than exploitative.54 The court also found that
changing the full-size photographs into smaller, lower-resolution images constituted
a transformative use from the originals by providing access to images on the
Internet and their websites, as opposed to the aesthetic function of the original
photographs. The court saw this transformation as a change in function from the
original work to the infringing use, rather than the “retransmission of … images in
a different medium,” simply because this change served the purpose of improving
access to information on the Internet rather than artistic expression.55 After
considering the other three factors of Section 107, the court concluded that since a
majority of the factors favored Arriba Soft, the use of the thumbnails should be
considered a fair use.56
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit again considered a fair use claim with very similar
facts to Kelly.57 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc, in which Google was a codefendant, had facts and a fair use defense analysis that was very similar to Kelly.58
The court found that Google’s use of the thumbnails was highly transformative
because they serve a different function than the original work’s aesthetic or
entertainment purpose.59 Google was found to have improved access to information

See generally Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146 (applying the fair use defense to
copyrighted photographs on the internet that were allegedly infringed upon by an online search
engine).
51 See Leval, supra note 21, at 1107.
52 See Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146.
53 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816-19.
54 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816-19.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 822.
57 See generally Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146.
58 Id. at 1155-57, 1163-68 (stating that Google was using thumbnail versions of full pictures from the
Perfect 10 website, a site offering nude photos to those willing to pay to be part of the “member’s
area”).
59 Id. at 1163-68; See also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819.
50
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on the Internet, a use that the court found to be new, different, and transformative
from Perfect 10’s original use for the photographs.60
Changing the theory of transformative use to give so much deference to
public enrichment over rewarding the authors goes beyond the guidance provided
by the statute in Section 107.61 The Supreme Court advocated for this change, so
long as it was done within the purposes of copyright, and also stated that lower
courts may lessen the weight of consideration of the last three factors so long as the
first factor is found through a transformative use.62 The Ninth Circuit takes this
one step further by looking to the great public service provided by these two similar
cases in terms of search engine functionality and accessibility, and how
transformative the use is without seeming to consider the other Section 107 factors
Judge Leval advised would protect the interests of the copyright owner.63 This shift
puts more emphasis on the needs of the public over the need to incentivize new
authors and creators to continue creating, unbalancing one of the core purposes of
copyright.64
C. Transforming Fair Use to Serve the Public: Google and HathiTrust
The Ninth Circuit is no longer one of the only Circuits to apply the
transformative use concept to the fair use defense by favoring vast public
enrichment over rights of authors. Two recent cases out of the Southern District of
New York in the Second Circuit have fully embraced this concept relating to the
Google Books Project.65
The Author’s Guild, a professional organization and advocate for writers,
brought suit against Google in late 2005 for its creation of the Google Books Project
and litigation continued through November of 2013.66 Google partnered with
academic libraries to create a large electronic database in which both copyrighted
books and books in the public domain are keyword-searchable and available in a
digital format.67 In Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Judge Chin found that
Google could exercise a fair use defense, relying heavily on Judge Leval’s article, the
ruling from the Supreme Court in Campbell, and the more recent Ninth Circuit

See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (going so far as to say that the search engine may have more
transformative use than the parody considered by the Supreme Court in Campbell).
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see generally Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146.
62 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
63 See Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; see also Leval, supra note 24, at 1110-11, 111625.
64 Leval, supra note 21, at 1106-07.
65 See generally HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445; Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282.
66 See generally Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (The history of this case between 2005 and 2011
concerned the two parties negotiating a settlement, which was denied by the Southern District of
New York. Following the denial, a new class-action suit was filed and recently decided in November
2013.).
67 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
60
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precedent regarding fair use.68 While there was an abundance of evidence pointing
to a prima facie case of copyright infringement by Google, it did not matter because
Google’s use of the copyrighted works was highly transformative. The court held
that Google changed “expressive text into a comprehensive word index that helps
readers, scholars, researchers, and others find books” and did not supersede the text
of the books.69
When taking into account the other factors, Judge Chin found that there
were not many convincing arguments made in favor of Author’s Guild, save for the
factor that considers the amount of the original work that is copied.70 When
considered overall, Judge Chin concluded that Google Books benefits both the public
and the authors and publishers. He therefore found a fair use defense in this case
would be in line with the principles of copyright.71
In a separate case with similar facts, Author’s Guild brought suit against
HathiTrust in 2011, a partnership of major academic research libraries founded in
2008, an offshoot of the Google Books Project.72 The main difference between this
case and the Google Books case is that HathiTrust is a group of libraries, and their
use of the material is presumed to be for nonprofit purposes rather than commercial
use.73
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust was decided in October 2012, a little
earlier than the main Google Books case.74 Relying on Campbell and the work of
Judge Leval, Judge Baer found that the first factor of Section 107 was satisfied in
its purpose for scholars and academic research, by protecting those works that still
have valid copyrights from being read in full without purchase, and under
transformative use, because the new purpose of the copied works was enhanced by
search capabilities of the text.75 After evaluating the other three factors and
concluding that transformative use undermined any favorable factors to the
Author’s Guild without a transformative use, Judge Baer ruled that HathiTrust
served the purposes of copyright to allow the fair use defense to apply in this case.76
These two cases show the rapid adoption of the first factor of Section 107, and
that if a transformative use is found, that use will determine whether or not a fair

Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
Id.
70 Id. at 291-92 (stating that all books were scanned and reproduced in their entirety, which would
normally be concerning, but since Google needed full verbatim scans of the books in order to offer a
full-text search of the books, Judge Chin found this to balance the harm of the taking).
71 Id. at 294.
72 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
73 See generally HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459; see 17 U.S.C. §107(1) (“factors to be considered
shall include - within the purpose and character of the use, whether or not a use is commercial in
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”).
74 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
75 Id. at 459-61.
76 Id. at 461-64.
68
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use defense applies in a given case.77 Starting with Judge Leval and the adoption of
his theory by the Supreme Court, then expanding from the Ninth Circuit into the
Second Circuit, this theory is likely to change how fair use is applied from precodification precedent and from how the statute suggests it should be applied.
D. Statutory Construction of Section 107: The Basics
The processes of legislative drafting and analysis of statutory language overlap
when deciding how to draft new legislation or how to properly interpret codified
language.78 Central to these processes are the canons of statutory principles
applied by judges when reading and interpreting a statute and considered by
legislators when drafting new legislation.79
These canons are extremely important to keep in mind when interpreting the
meaning of any statute, especially in the case of the fair use defense.80 The
codification in the 1976 Copyright Act of the defense was meant to condense
decades of judicial consideration and countless different interpretations into one
concept for judicial application across jurisdictions.81
III. STATUTORY MISCONSTRUCTION: THE PROPAGATION OF TRANSFORMATIVE USE
The current track of the fair use defense, especially following the decisions in
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., is
straying too far from the common statutory interpretation canons or principles.82
This section will analyze the traditional statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. § 107
and how Congress intended this defense to be applied based on the language itself
and the legislative history of the section’s drafting. This section will then apply this
statutory construction to the Author’s Guild cases and show how each decision’s
extension of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of fair use deviates from the
traditional statutory construction of the fair use defense.

See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-61; see also Campbell, 510
U.S. at 578 (adopting Judge Leval’s view of emphasizing the first factor of section 107 more than the
other three, if a ‘transformative use’ justification can be found).
78 See generally Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (last updated Aug. 31, 2008); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision & the Rules or Canons About How Statutes
Are to be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1949).
79 See Kim, supra note 78, at 1-2; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06.
80 See Kim, supra note 78, at 1-2; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06.
81 See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976).
82 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-61.
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A. The Codification of Fair Use: Restating Common Law
Section 107 was created intending to restate the judicial doctrine of the fair
use defense at the time that the statute was adopted.83 This codification includes a
preamble generally explaining the defense, four factors that judges are urged to
consider among others when analyzing a case for fair use, and a caveat regarding
the place of unpublished works within the defense.84 A traditional statutory
construction analysis considers many of the canons and any judge interpreting the
meaning of this statute, and how fair use applies to an individual case, should
consider these canons as well.85
Statutory construction based on the traditional canons emphasizes
starting and ending any analysis with the plain language of the statute,
especially if that language is unambiguous.86 This means that if the
language provided can plainly be discerned, then there is no need to turn to
the legislative history or Congressional intent for further guidance.87
However, if a statute is ambiguously written, or a literal reading would
create absurd results, it is common for courts to then look to the legislative
history of a document to garner further information on how Congress
intended the statute to be interpreted.88
For Section 107, the language is unambiguous, even if the application is more
difficult to understand.89 It states that notwithstanding the provisions of sections of
the Act that note the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners, fair use of a
specific copyrighted work for the purposes enumerated is not considered to be an
infringement of that copyright. These purposes include “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research.”90 The statute then lists four guiding factors that shall be included in any
analysis determining if an infringing use may be afforded a fair use defense, which
include: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the amount of the portion used in relation to the whole, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work.91 Finally, the statute
ends with a caveat that just because a work is unpublished, that alone will not bar a
finding of fair use if a finding can be made based on the four listed factors. 92 To
See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
85 See Kim, supra note 78, at 1-2; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06.
86 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403.
87 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2.
88 See Kim supra note 78, at 2-4; See also Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403 (giving the counter point
to the plain and unambiguous canon that it should not be read as being plain and unambiguous
“when literal interpretation would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart manifest
purpose”).
89 See Leval, supra note 21, at 1105-06.
90 17 U.S.C. § 107.
91 Id. at § 107(1)-(4).
92 17 U.S.C. § 107.
83
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summarize, a plain reading of the statute would say that fair use of a copyrighted
work for specific purposes will not be infringement and that the four factors should
be used in making that determination.93
The language itself gives no indication as to which of the factors, if
any, should weigh more in the analysis. This means all factors should be
considered without deference to a specific one.94 A plain reading would also
support that due to the subjective nature of the factors, every case
attempting to bring a fair use defense needs to be decided on its own
particular fact pattern because there is no bright-line standard for deciding if
something is considered a fair use.95 There are some things that may be
inferred based on specific words used within the statute.96 One example is
that because the words “shall include” are used prior to describing the factors
for consideration, all four factors should be considered by judges in their
analyses, but these are not the only factors that may be considered.97
Another example is that because the words “such as” are used before the list
of acceptable purposes that may bring a successful fair use defense, it may be
inferred that there are other possible acceptable purposes and that the list
provided is non-exhaustive.98
Considering that the language as interpreted above is unambiguous,
and would not lead to absurd results due to its success in American common
law for decades prior to codification, this would be a good reading of the
language of the statute.99 However, because the guidance given in Section
107 is so difficult to apply, despite being plainly stated, a judge would want to
look to legislative history for further guidance.100 While this is always a valid
option, the legislative history merely spells out what is obvious from a plain
reading of this statute itself.101 The history shows that courts are free to
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Id.
95 Id.; Accord S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
96 See Kim, supra note 78, at 6-7 (explaining that words that are not defined within the statute or are
not terms of art are given their ordinary, dictionary definitions); Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 302
(enumerating the canon of statutory construction that claims that words are to be taken in their
ordinary meaning unless they are technical or terms of art).
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see generally Kim, supra note 78; Llewellyn, supra note 78.
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
99 See Kim, supra note 78, at 6-7; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403 (noting that the counterpoints to
the traditional statutory construction canons of plain language and ordinary meaning do not really
apply in a situation where those interpretation do not cause absurd results that fall outside the
purposes of the statute).
100 See Leval, supra note 78, at 1105-06; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403 (noting the counter point to
having plainly stated text is to look to the legislative history for overall meaning of the statute).
Contra Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3 (explaining that the current trend of the Supreme Court is to
begin and end analysis of statutes with their plain meaning if discernible, rather than resorting to
legislative history).
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
93
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adapt the doctrine on a case-by-case basis, and that Section 107 was intended
to restate the judicial doctrine of fair use as it was developed prior to
codification, rather than change, narrow, or enlarge the doctrine in any
way.102 This is all consistent with a traditional statutory construction
analysis.103
Another traditional statutory construction principle is that a statute
should be read as a whole, where each section within is interpreted in a
broader statutory context to further the overall purposes of the statute.104 In
the context of the Copyright Act, the statute itself fulfills the part of the
United States Constitution that designates the right to Congress to create
copyright laws.105 The Constitution states that Congress has the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”106 This means that all copyright laws should be
written and interpreted with the broad purpose in mind that authors are
rewarded for sharing their creativity with the public by having a limited
monopoly over exclusive rights that go with the work, such as reproducing
and distributing the work.107 It is a balance between benefitting the public
intellectually and rewarding the work and creativity of the authors.108
Section 107 should be read with this general purpose in mind, which is often
acknowledged in opinions where judges are considering the fair use
defense.109 It is important to analyze the defense and the four factors listed
in Section 107 in a context that satisfies the core principles of copyright,
namely the balance mentioned above.110 Two important canons of statutory
construction that play off each other are the idea that every word and clause
of a statute must be given effect and that the courts should not add language
that Congress has not included.111 Statutes should not be construed to

S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
See generally Kim, supra note 78; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06.
104 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3 (“A statute should be read as a harmonious whole, with its various
parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory
purposes.”); Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 302 (including the canon that statutes in pari materia, or on
the same subject or matter, must be construed together).
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
106 Id.
107 Id.; see Leval, supra note 21, at 1107-08; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing examples of exclusive
rights granted to a copyright owner upon the granting of a copyright for a work, including right to
make and distribute copies, right to public display, right to sound recordings, etc.).
108 Leval, supra note 21, at 1107-08.
109 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-78.
110 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-78 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one
from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.”); Leval, supra note 21, at 1110-11.
111 See Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
102
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render superfluous any of the language included.112 Similarly, Congress put
time and effort into creating a statute and going further to amend it, so the
courts should be wary of including and making crucial any new language to
the statute.113 This prevents judges from undermining the authority of
Congress and interpreting the laws as they were written, allowing for respect
of the drafting process of Congress itself for choosing certain language. A
counterargument to this may be that the general rule is contrary to a very
prominent and evident meaning that judges feel should be applied, and that
judges should be given the leeway to interpret as they see fit to the particular
situation in a case.114
Section 107 should include all four factors, even if they are not to be
weighed equally by a judge during his or her consideration of a case’s
individual fair use defense.115 Also, a judge should not add language to what
is already given, and, in the case of Section 107, that would mean an
additional factor that must always be considered or an additional
consideration within a specific factor.116 To commit either one of these
actions not only goes against traditional statutory construction principles,
but also against the common law foundations of the fair use defense.117
Similarly, another traditional canon is that words and phrases that
have received judicial construction before enactment should be understood
according to that construction.118 The fair use defense is based off of judicial
constructs beginning with those factors and concepts enumerated in Folsom
v. Marsh.119 The statute and legislative history state that all factors should
be considered on a case-by-case basis and provide a list of factors that would
be most useful to the majority of analyses.120 These basic concepts were used
in the common law for decades before being codified. Therefore, in the case of
Section 107, the codified construction is what judges should use in their
analyses.121
There are many other canons of statutory construction that may be
See Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13 (citing Monclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)) (“A basic
principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was
ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’); Llewellyn, supra note 80, at 404.
113 See Kim, supra note 78, at 13.
114 See Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
116 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13.
117 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404; S. REP. NO. 94473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
118 See generally Kim, supra note 78, at 18 (explaining that if Congress wanted to depart from an
established interpretation at common law, it would make it clear not only in the statute but also in
its legislative history); see also Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401.
119 17 U.S.C. § 107. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
120 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
121 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
112
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observed and applied to Section 107, but do not add substantially more to
what has already been discussed.122 While this statutory construction is
based on a hypothetical reading of the fair use defense, it, like the defense
itself, comes to life when applied to a case’s fact pattern.
IV. GOOGLE AND HATHITRUST IGNORE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Traditional statutory construction of 17 U.S.C. § 107 lends most
credence to a plain reading of the statute supplemented by the legislative
intent.123 What is clear from the precedent set in the Ninth Circuit with
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., and the
expansion of that precedent in New York’s Southern District through
Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., is
that the courts are beginning to move away from the traditional statutory
construction of Section 107 by focusing heavily on transformative use.124 By
moving away from this construction, in essence, the Second and Ninth
Circuits are moving away from decades of judicial construction of the fair use
defense that Section 107 was meant to codify.125 The Author’s Guild cases
use the crutches of increased technology and large public benefits to avoid
applying the traditional statutory construction to achieve a particular
result.126 This comes at the cost of the individual authors and publishing
companies retaining profits for their creativity and creates a lack of incentive,
all while under the guise of being “in light of the purposes of copyright.”127
The following contains specific examples of how this focuses on the first factor
listed in Section 107, and is based solely on whether an infringing use is
transformative or not, that strays away from the traditional statutory
construction of the section.
The most obvious canons that are violated here, and that can be considered
an overarching theme for other statutory construction principles that are ignored,
are that a statute must be analyzed by its plain language and that a statute must
be read as a whole with each section striving to achieve an overall purpose. 128

See Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401-06.
Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 403.
124 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 290-92; Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at
459-60; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163.
125 17 U.S.C. § 107; see S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66; Leval, supra note.
24, at 1106-07, 1111-12; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
126 See Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92; HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 458-64 (finding in both cases
that the benefit to the public in general, and the print-disabled public in particular, makes the
complete copying of the books and articles a transformative use to a keyword-searchable book
database).
127 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
128 See Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 402-03.
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123

26

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. VOL. 5, ISS. 1 (2015)
Transforming Transformative Use:
The Growing Misinterpretation of the Fair Use Doctrine
Both HathiTrust and Google ignore the plain language reading of Section 107
by giving almost all consideration to the first factor and relating back the other
three to the fact that the first factor has been found.129 In both HathiTrust and
Google, Judges Baer and Chin, after finding that the infringing use was
transformative and therefore satisfied the first factor of Section 107, referred back
to the first factor and the transformative use when setting out their brief analyses
of the other three factors in each case.130 The plain reading of the statute infers
that each factor should be considered fully and then considered overall to determine
if a fair use defense exists.131 While the judge determines the weight each factor
should be given in the analysis, including those factors the judge wishes to consider
not enumerated in the statute, it is logical to believe that each factor deserves its
own careful contemplation.132
Both cases also ignore the overall purpose of the Copyright Act.133 While
Judge Chin specifically mentions that he believes all parties benefit in some way
from the Google Books database, he glosses over the harms suffered by the
individual authors and publishing companies.134 Google took thousands of books,
digitized them, kept copies for itself, distributed them in snippets to the public, in
full text back to the libraries, all without payment of any kind to the copyright
holders.135 While this enriches the intellect of the public, it woefully ignores the
rights of the authors and publishers who suffered unauthorized copying and
distributions of their copyrighted works.136
Another canon of statutory construction that both cases disregard is that
every word and clause of a statute must be given effect.137 As discussed above,
Google and HathiTrust put the most emphasis on finding the first factor, with a
determination that a transformative use exists without the other three factors of
Section 107.138 This makes the other three factors, forged in the common law and
then codified to reflect that judicial construction, mere surplusage.139 It implies
that Congress did not need to bother including the other three factors if courts
today only feel the need to briefly run through them once determining there was a
transformative use.140
More specifically to HathiTrust, there is another section of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 108, that deals with the exceptions to copyright infringement pertaining
Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 6-11; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-64.
Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 6-11; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-64.
131 17 U.S.C. § 107; Kim, supra note 80 at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 80 at 403.
132 17 U.S.C. § 107. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
133 Kim, supra note 78, at 2-3; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 402-03.
134 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 293-94.
135 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 293-94.
136 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
137 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
138 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 290-92; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-64.
139 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
140 17 U.S.C. § 107; Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
129
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to libraries.141 As written, Section 108 gives leeway to fair use defenses if Section
107 is not found to apply, but the fact that Judge Baer completely waived off the
argument that Section 108 applied without considering it further almost renders
Section 108 as surplusage.142 If Section 108 never applies because Section 107
supersedes it, even when the allegedly infringing party is a library, no library will
ever feel the need to use the protections afforded under Section 108 if they may
obtain a defense more easily from Section 107.143
More specifically to Google, Judge Chin disregards the commercial nature of
Google, thus disregarding that an activity having a commercial character, while not
dispositive, needs to be weighed with the other factors in the overall
consideration.144 Judge Chin dismisses the commercial purpose of the activity by
saying that Google only indirectly profited from the Google Books project and does
not weigh that consideration with the others.145 While it is a hard line to draw,
Congress would not have specifically included a provision that a judge should
consider the commercial, not-for-profit, or educational character of the use, if it was
not meant to factor into the overall analysis. Otherwise, those words would be
surplusage.146
The canon that is often considered with surplusage, that the courts should
not add something where Congress has not, also applies to the analysis employed in
both Author’s Guild cases.147 Both cases added the concept of the transformative
use to the first factor in Section 107.148 Congress amended the language from “the
purpose and character of the use” to the language as it currently stands, explicitly
adding, “whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes.”149 There have also been amendments to Section 107 in 1990 and 1992,
and further amendments to the Copyright Act in 1998.150 There was ample time for
Congress to consider the ruling of the Supreme Court in Campbell and its adoption
of Judge Leval’s transformative use in light of the rise of new technology; however,
Congress chose to keep the language as it was.151 If Congress wanted
transformative use to be the cornerstone of the fair use defense, Congress could
See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (stating the affirmative defense that libraries may use when a suit for
infringement of the exclusive rights of making and distributing copies within the libraries of
copyrighted works, and in what situations that defense applies).
142 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 456-58; see also 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4); Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13;
Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
143 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
144 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d. at 291-92; see S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66
(explaining in both legislative histories that all factors need to be weighed somehow in a fair use
analysis).
145 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92.
146 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 404.
147 Kim, supra note 78, at 12-13; Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401.
148 HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 459-61; Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92.
149 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
150 Id.
151 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
141
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have made it so, and for the courts to continue to disregard this and add to Section
107 goes against traditional statutory construction principles.152
Finally, the fair use defense received considerable judicial construction before
the codification of Section 107.153 Understanding a statute in light of that common
law construction is another canon of traditional statutory construction.154
Beginning with Folsom v. Marsh and continuing through the years, Section 107 is
meant to be simply a restatement of all case law that led up to the 1976 Copyright
Act regarding the fair use defense.155 Each application is to be considered on a caseby-case basis and to be analyzed with at least the four factors enumerated within
Section 107, because that was the judicial construction of the fair use defense prior
to codification.156 It was only in the last twenty or so years with Judge Leval and
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell, as well as the rapid expansion of the
concept by the Ninth Circuit, that transformative use has started to gain judicial
popularity.157 Both Google and HathiTrust rely heavily on the post-codification
construction of the fair use defense that involves transformative use, which is a far
cry from the way judges traditionally interpreted the statute.158
Though these are not the only examples of traditional statutory construction
principles that could be applied to these cases, it is clear from this analysis that the
adoption of transformative use truly transforms how the fair use defense is
applied.159 It is hard to tell if there will be future expansion of this post-codification
construction of Section 107, but what is certain is that it is now too far from the way
it should be read by judges and others.160
V. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL EXPANSION: SOLUTIONS TO A FAIR USE FAUX PAS
The Southern District of New York’s application of the fair use principle,
especially its application of the transformative use doctrine, is not something that is
accepted across the board and may generate litigation in other jurisdictions over the
same issues with varied results. It is clear from this that a clarification of the parts
of the Copyright Act that deal directly with the fair use defense would provide the
necessary guidance for correct application of the defense. This clarification may
come from one of two sources: either the Supreme Court or Congress.

See Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401, 404.
See generally Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342.
154 Llewellyn, supra note 78, at 401.
155 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
156 17 U.S.C. § 107; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66.
157 Leval, supra note 21, at 1111-12; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Perfect 10,
508 F.3d at 1163.
158 Leval, supra note 21, at 1111-12; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Perfect 10,
508 F.3d at 1163.
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The first option would require a case attempting to interpret how the fair use
defense applies and the role of the doctrine of transformative use, to be accepted on
appeal to the Supreme Court. Both the HathiTrust and Google decisions are
appealable and could possibly escalate to the Second Circuit, and further petitioned
to the Supreme Court. It is possible that there is ample case law in other Circuits
that could be appealed as well. A recommendation would be for the Supreme Court
to conduct a statutory construction analysis to determine how far the fair use
defense, and other judicial constructs like transformative use, may go in terms of
favoring the public over the authors. A true reading of the statute based on the
canons of statutory construction would give credence to an interpretation that
current case law is going too far from the purpose of the fair use defense and the
overall purpose of the Copyright Act.161 The Ninth Circuit and Southern District of
New York’s decisions upset the balance that is inherent in the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution and the Copyright Act, and that is struck between the needs of the
public and the need to provide incentive to authors and creators by favoring the
public benefit.162 A Supreme Court decision would provide a clear and uniform
interpretation of the fair use defense to apply across the Circuits, limiting extensive
future litigation costs and further confusion regarding Section 107.
The Supreme Court may also be able to combine sections in the Copyright
Act. If the Court were to analyze and interpret the relationship between Section
107 and Section108, then library exception cases such as the Author’s Guild cases
would be easier to decide.163 As it is currently written, Section 108 provides an
affirmative defense to copyright infringement on the exclusive right of reproduction
so long as the infringer is a library or archive, and only a certain number of copies
are reproduced for specific purposes.164 This section was updated to include a
defense for digitization of works, but only for purposes of preservation of, or ease of
access to, the work.165 However, the section carves out the fair use defense by
stating “nothing in this section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided
by Section 107.”166 In light of new technological advances showcased in the Author’s
Guild cases, in particular the HathiTrust decision, the most recent amendment to
Section 108 is outdated technologically, shifts a court’s analysis to section 107, and
fails to utilize Section 108.167 A Supreme Court decision consistent with
technological advances that helps to clarify how the two defenses work together
would be a good solution to the current problem.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107; Llewellyn, supra note 80, at 401-06.
Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 293-94; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818;
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163.
163 HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 458-61; see generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108 (stating that section
108 is not meant to interfere with any rights or defenses provided in section 107 as currently
written).
164 17 U.S.C. § 108.
165 Id. § 108(b)(2), (c)(2).
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Another option would be one of several legislative solutions, which include
amending the current Copyright Act and clarifying Section 107, Section 108, or
both, to allow for a clearer application of the fair use defense to internet-based
works. This option, regardless of what sections are amended, is more likely than
consideration by the Supreme Court.
An amendment to Section 107 should consider the current language before
and after the four factors enumerated for judicial consideration.168 Language that
would be most effective in clarifying the present problems with the interpretation of
the fair use defense would have to explain how much weight should be given to any
one factor listed in the statute for consideration, and may even include an
acceptable interpretation of transformative use.169 An amendment to Section 108
would need to be directed at the amount of copies and the purposes for which a
library may digitize copyrighted works within its collection.170 This would address
cases like HathiTrust more directly, and if amended in a way that considers the
advancement of technology where digitization is concerned, Section 108 could be
properly used in conjunction with the fair use defense.171 An amendment to both
sections would allow for cases like the Author’s Guild decisions to be analyzed and
ruled on with no doubt as to the Congressional intent behind the statute and how it
should be applied in situations with commercial entities in opposition to nonprofit
libraries.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unclear from the most recent opinions in Author’s Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust and Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., whether any issues will be
appealed and whether the courts will consider this issue of transformative use
within the scope of the fair use defense. The question remains whether these recent
changes signify a permanent shift in the state of this area of copyright law or if they
are merely a fluke that will be corrected by any or all of the recommendations listed
above. This interpretation does not comply with traditional statutory construction
principles. It is discomforting that both the established case law and more recent
developing precedent only 25 years after codification, can rapidly change without
Congressional input as to the original intent of the Act. One can only hope that
some sort of solution in the form of Congressional or Supreme Court intervention
will arrive to clear up and refocus the appropriate construction for Section 10.
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